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Assistance of Counsel as a Means of
Getting a “Second Bite at the Apple.”
Prentice L. White*
ABSTRACT
The United States Constitution provides individuals con-
victed of a crime with “a second bite at the apple.”  The Sixth
Amendment provides an avenue to appeal one’s conviction
based on the claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel.”  What
were the Framers’ true intentions in using the phrase “effective
assistance of counsel”?  How does the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 affect habeas corpus
appeals?  This article answers these questions through the eyes of
Thomas—a fictional character who is appealing his murder
conviction.
This article first looks at the history surrounding effective
assistance of counsel and discusses the difficulties criminal de-
fendants face when asserting Sixth Amendment claims in both
the federal and state context.  This article takes a deep dive into a
criminal defendant’s rights and the defendant’s burden of proof
on appeal.  Finally, this article concludes with a “survivor’s
guide” for newly-licensed trial attorneys who work as defense
counsel in criminal cases.  As part of this guide, this author sug-
gests various methods attorneys can implement, which may help
defense attorneys defend themselves against claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
* Prentice L. White is an Associate Professor of Law at the Southern University
Law Center, and is a contract attorney with the Louisiana Appellate Project
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Criminal defense work, regardless of public opinion, is a no-
ble profession and is vital to maintaining a healthy judicial system
for society as a whole.  Many criminal cases present defense at-
torneys with difficult arguments to make.  Nevertheless, criminal
defense attorneys must represent their clients to the best of their
abilities, like all other attorneys, and ensure that their clients re-
ceive fair and impartial trials.  At the same time, defense attor-
neys must always be aware of potential pitfalls that can turn the
defense counsel into the defendant.  Criminal defendants, as part
of their habeas petitions, will not hesitate to attack their attor-
neys while pursuing their second bite at the apple.
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For the past three weeks, Thomas had gone to the law library
at the state penitentiary, poring over 20 dusty federal reporters
every day, looking for a way to escape the hell hole he was dumped
into following his conviction for second1 degree murder.2  At night,
he would read the cases he copied from the old3 federal reporters4
that looked like they had been found in the dumpster behind a law
firm that was closed in the early nineties.5  Naturally, it would take
1. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:30.1 (West 2017).
2. See Joseph M. Williams, STYLE TOWARD CLARITY AND GRACE, 19 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1990) quoting:
Stories are among the first kind of continuous discourse we learn.  From
the time we are children, we all tell stories to achieve a multitude of
ends—to amuse, to warn, to achieve, to excite, to inform, to explain, to
persuade.  Storytelling is fundamental to human behavior.  No other form
of prose can communicate large amounts of information so quickly and
persuasively.
See also N. O. Stockmeyer, Jr., Beloved are the Storytellers, 81 MICH. B. J. 54
(2002).
3. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 771 (3d Cir. 1979) (arguing that
discarding out-of-date advance sheets and supplemental pamphlets from the prison
did not interfere with the prisoner’s access to the court; the adequacy of the
materials that remained in the library was the paramount concern for the courts).
4. See MARRY ELLEN WEST, 30 ILL. L. & PRAC. PRISONS § 48 (2017) (“[T]o
satisfy the right to meaningful access to the courts under the due process clause, a
prisoner only needs to receive access to a law library that will enable [them] to
research the law and determine which facts are necessary to state a cause of
action”). See also Hadley v. Snyder, 780 N.E. 2d 316, 323–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
5. See Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrs., 776 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1985)
(arguing that a prison’s primary responsibility is to provide an inmate with
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him hours6 to read and understand the decisions from these cases
because he had no legal training and he needed to look up every
other word in Black’s Law Dictionary.
Though the verdict was unanimous, Thomas strenuously
opposed any responsibility for the death of the victim.  The killing
was the result of a turf war between the decedent and Thomas’s co-
defendant, Christopher.  Christopher was a known felon in the
neighborhood.  In Thomas’s neighborhood, murder was as common
as finding a beer bottle in the street.  While he readily admitted to
being present during the shooting, Thomas was unarmed at the time
and he had only realized that the decedent was shot when he heard
one of the women on the street let out a loud scream.  Thomas’s
defense counsel argued at trial that it was Christopher who had
been involved in an altercation with the decedent 20 minutes before
the shooting, but apparently the jury did not believe that Thomas
was just an innocent bystander.
The only eyewitness7 at the shooting testified that both
Thomas and Christopher were seen running together after the
victim was shot.  Thomas’s attorney stood and made several
objections during the eyewitness’s testimony, but these objections
seemed rather weak because his attorney struggled to identify the
specific reason why he was objecting.8  Counsel’s cross-examination
was not any better.  At the beginning of the second day of his trial,
Thomas made several oral motions to represent himself,9 but the
district judge denied his requests, since defense counsel had been
present for each of the ten hearings during the discovery10 phase.
meaningful access to the courts, and that the law book inventory must meet
minimum constitutional standards).
6. Id. at 858 (asserting that prison administrators must be able to regulate the
time, manner, and place in which law library materials are used by the inmates).
7. See Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340, 358–59 (6th Cir. 2015) (indicating
that the refusal to allow the defendant to impeach unavailable witnesses’ prior
testimony with later recantations violated the Sixth Amendment); see also United
States v. Holland, 41 F. Supp. 3d 82, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (gauging witnesses’
credibility using a five-factor test); Daniel v. Loizzo, 986 F. Supp. 245, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that a defendant is prohibited from using stale felony
convictions against a witness for impeachment purposes).
8. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (stating that a
person who happens to be alongside the accused who merely happens to be a
lawyer is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command for legal
representation).
9. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (declaring that a
defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, and the state cannot force a lawyer
upon him when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense).
10. See LaFler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 177–82 (2012) (Justice Scalia
reconsidering his view that a defendant who voluntarily pleads guilty or rejects a
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Counsel shared every document he received from the prosecutor’s
file with Thomas, and the district court specifically saw defense
counsel sharing his notes on prospective jurors with Thomas during
voir dire.  Given the fact that defense counsel was actively and
zealously representing Thomas, the district judge did not find any
sufficient11 grounds to disrupt the trial and have Thomas take over
presenting testimonial and physical evidence to the jury.
The three-day jury trial was very difficult for Thomas and his
family.  He remembered how his mother and sister cried every time
they saw him in court.  He watched in horror as the jurors watched
his attorney stutter through each question and mumble his
objections on the record.  There was a moment where counsel
forgot12 certain exceptions to the hearsay rule under the evidence
code.  Thomas tried to give some instruction to his attorney during
the trial, but each of his handwritten comments was pushed aside
because his attorney claimed that he needed to hear the witness’s
answers and could not entertain his client’s trivial questions.  When
the guilty verdict was rendered, Thomas nearly fainted because he
could not believe that such a one-sided trial could ever be
considered constitutional.  Based on his recollection of the facts,13
Thomas did not feel that he was ever implicated in this shooting.
One month ago, Thomas received the decision from the
appellate court.  He had written a pro se brief in conjunction with
his appellate counsel’s brief, but he feared that neither appellate
counsel nor the appellate court judges actually read his brief.
Thomas initially wanted to argue that he was mentally unfit to
proceed to trial in the first place, but after spending over three
weeks researching, drafting, and revising his brief to the appellate
court, he knew that such an argument was contradictory because he
never acted insane prior to his arrest, and his well-crafted brief
plea offer should be immune from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim—
regardless of whether the guilty plea or its refusal was based on counsel’s
professional deficient advice).  See also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Peter
A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers to Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103 (2014) [hereinafter Systemic Barriers].
11. See Brooks v. McCaughtry, 380 F.3d 1009, 1010, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the defendant must show that he possesses sufficient educational
background or knowledge of the law to represent himself).
12. See United States v. Loera, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1202 (D.N.M. 2016)
(citing the mistakes of defense counsel during trial can be inexcusable).
13. See David Maxfield and Michael Deutch, Mind Mapping for Lawyers, 21
S.C. LAW. 18, 19 (2009) (declaring that most individuals learn in three specific
ways—auditory, kinesthetic, and visual.  Auditory learners use sounds,
conversations, melodies, etc., which lends itself to sequential thinking; material
must be presented to them in a logical, ordered progression and they generally
problem solve by attacking the issue(s) in a series of ordered steps).
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made him appear well-versed in the law.14  As he read the opinion,
he noticed that each of the arguments he and his attorney carefully
drafted was met with the badge of meritless, harmless,15 or
immaterial from the appellate judges.  As Thomas turned the pages
to this decision, he became more and more depressed.  When the
appellate court ruled that his conviction was affirmed, Thomas
threw all of the cases, statutes, and police reports he had researched
against the wall of his cell.16  The next morning, while picking up
the papers from the floor of his cell, Thomas ran across his
commitment order, which explained that he had two years17 to file a
post-conviction relief application in the district court.  A quick
chat18 with the inmate lawyer19 revealed that Thomas had another20
opportunity to reverse his wrongful conviction.
Days turned into weeks and all Thomas did was commit
himself more and more to drafting his post-conviction application.
He  memorized the post-conviction relief statute.  Thomas was now
ready to launch into a new unchartered claim known as “ineffective
assistance of counsel.”  After all, in Thomas’s mind, he was sitting
in this cell because his trial counsel was incompetent, unprepared,21
14. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (contending that whenever a
defendant has demonstrated that his sanity was questionable at the time of the
offense, the State must give him access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense). See generally McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790
(2017).
15. See United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1135, 1140–44, 1146–50 (11th Cir.
2017) (ruling that defense counsel’s seven-minute absence from the trial while
inculpatory testimony was being admitted did not fall under an exception to the
harmless error rule because counsel did not miss a substantial part of the trial, and
said testimony was repeated when counsel returned and counsel subjected the
prosecution’s case to adequate adversarial testing).
16. See generally Karen Westwood, “Meaningful Access to the Court” and
Law Libraries:  Where Are We Now, 90 L. LIBR. J. 193 (1998).
17. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 930.8 (2014).
18. In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the United States Supreme
Court struck down a regulation that prohibited prisoners from assisting each other
with habeas corpus applications and other legal matters.
19. See generally United States ex. rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane,
656 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d, 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir. 1987).
20. See Riascos-Prado v. United States, 66 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1995) (urging
the fact that issues relative to ineffective assistance of counsel can be addressed on
direct appeal unless the issue requires further elaboration using material outside of
the appellate record; however, the defendant is not free to exclude ineffective
assistant of counsel claims with the hope of preserving the issue for post-conviction
review). See also Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1993).
21. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH L. REV. 2001, 2015 (1998) (sponsoring the idea that the remedy for a
defendant who is convicted based on his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness may strike
the courts as being too extreme, which means that when the courts “cannot
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unconcerned, and inexperienced.22  This was Thomas’s second bite
at the apple and he was not going to let anyone or anything stop
him from securing his right to freedom.
Though it was another opportunity to get into court, Thomas’s
journey to freedom would not be on either a straight or a smooth
path.  One glaring roadblock in his path was the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996.23  The AEDPA
provides a deferential standard of review for federal courts
regarding state court convictions.  In other words, it reduces the
reach of a federal court’s authority by only granting writs of review
when the court finds the state court’s decision unreasonable, and
the federal court cannot reverse that decision merely due to
disagreement.24
In this Article, this Author will explore the true intentions of
the framer’s phraseology of “effective assistance of counsel” inside
the United State Constitution.25  Secondly, this Article will address
the difficulty many criminal defendants face when asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims in state and federal
habeas corpus proceedings.  Finally, this Author will provide
something like a “survivor’s guide” for newly-licensed trial
attorneys who elect to represent defendants in criminal cases,
describing how they can avoid IAC claims being filed against them.
Further, this Author will suggest certain methods these attorneys
can implement to defend themselves in the event such claims are
filed.
I. HISTORY OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
calibrate the remedy,” they generally begin to “fudge on the right”).  See also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (No. 10-
444), wherein Justice Scalia commented that “one of the things that causes [the
courts] to be suspicious of whether there’s a constitutional violation [is when] . . .
there really isn’t any perfect remedy.”
22. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775–76 (2017) (asserting that defense
counsel’s introduction of expert testimony that disclosed that his client was
statistically more prone to violence in the future because he was black was not
competent representation).
23. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2017).
24. Sharad Sushi Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows:
Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 96 MICH. L. REV. 434, 435 (1997).  See also
Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t Get There from Here?”: Ineffective Assistance
Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545 (2009)
[hereinafter You Can’t Get There from Here].
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence (sic).26
Reviewing the language used in the Sixth27 Amendment, we
realize that the Framers mentioned that an individual accused in a
criminal prosecution shall have the “Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”  There is no indication that counsel be effective, compe-
tent, or experienced in the realm of criminal law.28  The term effec-
tive assistance of counsel did not materialize until the United States
Supreme Court holding in McMann v. Richardson,29 wherein the
Supreme Court opined that the beauty of Amendment VI was the
recognition that the assistance of counsel mentioned in the federal
constitution was meant to bring about justice for each criminal de-
fendant by having the prosecution’s case put through the crucible30
of meaningful adversarial testing by a defense attorney who is well-
versed in criminal procedure, evidence and trial advocacy such that
the partisan advocacy31 on both sides of a case will best promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent
go free.32
This essentially is “the very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice.”33  Consequently, without the adversarial testing
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a fair trial would be unattain-
able and the subsequent guilty verdict would be invalid.34  The
26. Id.
27. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856–58 (1975) (stating that at the
heart of the Sixth Amendment is the requirement that every indigent criminal de-
fendant should have appointed legal counsel, and said appointment would prevent
the State from conducting trials against individuals facing incarceration without
adequate legal assistance).
28. Id.
29. McMann v. Richardson, 379 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970).
30. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133–34 (1982). See also United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1976).
31. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68, (1938) (finding that “[u]nless
a defendant charged with a serious offense has counsel able to invoke the procedu-
ral and substantive safeguards that distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk
of injustice infects the trial itself”). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 314 U.S. 219,
236–37.
32. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665–66 (1984).
33. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
34. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).
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State, and possibly defense counsel, would become the culprits who
deprived the defendant of his liberty if a conviction was obtained
through such a skewed and unjust process.35
The ineffectiveness of Thomas’s attorney in the introduction of
this Article was evident from counsel’s late and unconvincing objec-
tions to the prosecution’s questions.  It could be seen from the awk-
wardness of his questions on cross-examination and from counsel’s
unwillingness to involve Thomas in the trial strategy for the case.
There was even a moment in record where defense counsel intro-
duced evidence to a witness for impeachment purposes, but inad-
vertently forgot to offer it into evidence for the record.
Realistically, defense counsel’s performance, at least in Thomas’s
eyes, could not have been the product of any preparedness, profes-
sionalism, or competence.  From the prosecution’s perspective, de-
fense counsel’s clumsy trial technique was the equivalent of a three-
year-old child warming up for a sparring session with a three-year-
old Rottweiler.
In McMann v. Richardson, three separate state prisoners
(Dash, Richardson, and Williams) filed federal habeas corpus36 pe-
titions, challenging their felony convictions for first-degree robbery,
first-degree murder, and robbery respectively.37  In each of their
cases, these defendants argued before the nation’s highest court
that their convictions should be reversed because their individual
defense attorneys failed to give them proper legal advice prior to
their entry of a guilty plea to their respective charges.  More specifi-
cally, they each alleged that their guilty pleas were the result of
coerced confessions from either the trial judge or from law enforce-
ment officers through the use of police brutality.38
First, the United States Supreme Court noted that a conviction
after a guilty plea is constitutionally valid because the conviction
rests on the defendant’s admission in open court that he committed
the acts with which he was charged.39  Such an admission, therefore,
relieves the prosecution of the requirement to prove the defen-
dant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant further
waives any right to contest the admissibility of any evidence that
35. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29–33 (1972).
36. See You Can’t Get There from Here, supra note 24, at 559 (stating that
habeas corpus is an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment; it is written
in the Constitution and neither the Executive nor Congress can abridge this
safeguard).
37. See McMann v. Richardson, 379 U.S. 759, 762 (1970).
38. See id. at 763.
39. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). See also McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
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the State might have offered against him at trial.40  Thus, for a crim-
inal defendant to subsequently allege through a post-conviction
proceeding that his guilty plea must be reversed is an extremely
high hurdle to jump when the grounds for his reversal are that his
trial counsel misadvised41 him during the pre-trial phase of his case.
Further, defense counsel’s decision to have his client enter a guilty
plea in order to save the State the expense and agony of a trial and
to save him from a harsher penalty cannot be considered either in-
effective or an obvious violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.42
The Supreme Court in McMann went on to mention that the
State’s right to use the defendant’s incriminating statement against
him at trial is permissible to show the strength of the prosecution’s
case, and that an entry of a guilty plea before a jury is impaneled is
advantageous for the defendant.43  Unless the defendant can show
to the reviewing court something more than the fact that his confes-
sion may have been coerced, the conviction should stand, and the
petition44 for habeas corpus relief should be denied.45  Defendants
should not conjure up various arbitrary reasons to overturn their
convictions, but the Supreme Court also opined that defendants
should not be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.46  Instead,
district judges should demand compliance with proper standards of
performance by attorneys (appointed or retained) who are repre-
senting defendants in criminal cases.47
The McCann court stated that criminal defendants who chal-
lenge their convictions under the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim must portray their conviction as being constitutionally defec-
tive in a manner that is something more than just encouraging the
reviewing court to second guess the lower court’s decision to con-
vict.48  From Thomas’s perspective, his goal was to illustrate to the
district court in his post-conviction petition that his conviction re-
sulted from either his counsel’s:  (1) unpreparedness, (2) lack of in-
40. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
41. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147–49 (2012).
42. See McMann, 397 U.S. at 767–68.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 321 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ill. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91–92 (1976) (finding that a
bar on attorney-client consultations during an overnight recess was a denial of the
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel).
46. Id.
47. See McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
48. Id.
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vestigation, (3) unfamiliarity with the intricate details49 of the laws
of evidence and criminal procedure, (4) inexperience, or (5) coun-
sel’s lack of a coherent trial strategy moments before ultimately en-
couraging the defendant to amend his plea.  While any of the five
above-mentioned claims could be sufficient grounds to bring a le-
gally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Au-
thor suggests that the defendant should prove a combination of two
or more elements to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
In Missouri v. Frye,50 the United States Supreme Court was
faced with a uniquely different situation where a defendant was
charged with driving with a revoked license and the offense was
converted to a Class D felony upon discovery that the defendant
had been convicted of the same offense on three other occasions.51
The prosecutor presented two favorable plea bargains to defense
counsel.  In the first offer, the prosecutor recommended a three-
year sentence if the defendant entered a guilty plea to the felony
charge and accepted ten days in jail as “shock time.”  In the second
offer, the prosecutor recommended a 90-day sentence if the defen-
dant would enter a guilty plea to the misdemeanor offense.  The
misdemeanor charge usually carried a maximum term of one year
in prison.  Both offers were presented in a letter to defense counsel,
but counsel failed to communicate the offers to the defendant, and
the offers subsequently expired.52  Counsel’s performance was
deemed ineffective because he was unprepared and failed to per-
form the simplest of functions as defense counsel—keeping his cli-
ent abreast53 of any new developments in his case.54
In United States v. Cronic,55 the defendant and two other indi-
viduals were indicted and convicted of mail fraud involving a
“check kiting” scheme that resulted in more than nine million dol-
lars being illegally transferred between banks in Florida and
Oklahoma.  The defendant was identified in approximately 11 of
the 13 counts listed in the indictment.56  When the defendant’s re-
49. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980) (arguing that multiple
representation of a defendant and two of his co-defendants does not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel even when the complaining defendant is subse-
quently convicted and the two co-defendants are later acquitted).
50. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
51. Id. at 138.
52. Id.
53. Ray Taylor, Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings, 31 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 633 (1984).
54. See generally Joel Mallord, Putting Plea Bargaining on the Record, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 683 (2014).
55. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
56. Id. at 648–649.
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tained attorney withdrew, the district court appointed new counsel.
The defendant found new counsel to be ineffective following his
subsequent conviction and sentencing to 25 years in prison.57  In his
appeal, the defendant alleged that his counsel was ineffective and in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right because his attorney (1) was
given only 25 days to prepare for trial; (2) was inexperienced in
criminal law, since he primarily operated a real estate practice; and
(3) was virtually inaccessible to the defendant during the 25 days he
was preparing for trial. The defendant argued, in contrast, that the
Government had over four years to investigate and to review
thousands of documents related to this serious and complicated
case.58
On the surface, it may appear that the defendant in Cronic had
a perfectly plausible argument of ineffective assistance of counsel
simply based on the inadequate time that his newly appointed attor-
ney had to prepare for trial.  However, the United States Supreme
Court disagreed.  The Court affirmed the notion that the right to
effective counsel is an integral part of a criminal defendant’s right
to a fair and impartial trial.59  The Supreme Court went on to say
that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meaningless unless
the aggrieved defendant can show an actual breakdown of the ad-
versarial process during the trial of his case.60
In other words, simply showing that defense counsel did not
have as much time as the prosecution or that counsel had not han-
dled as many felony criminal cases as the prosecutor is not suffi-
cient enough to label counsel as  ineffective.61  If defense counsel is
actively and zealously representing his client even with having just a
fraction of the time than that available to the prosecutor, the defen-
dant has not shown prejudice.62  Actually, counsel’s effectiveness is
portrayed when counsel has exhibited average or above-average
competence63 in his representation despite the fact that he had less
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 658.
60. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–69 (1982);
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
61. See Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 915 (1970) (noting that “a criminal defendant is entitled to rever-
sal of his conviction whenever he makes some showing of a possible conflict of
interest or prejudice, however remote”).
62. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663 (1984).
63. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151–52 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that the proper standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective
assistance”).
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time to prepare than his opponent and had not handled complex
criminal cases in his legal history.
In addition to Cronic, consider the decision in Weaver v. Mas-
sachusetts,64 wherein the defendant filed an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, alleging that his trial counsel violated his Sixth
Amendment right simply because counsel failed to object to the
prosecution’s request to close the courtroom during jury selection.65
The jury trial, however, was open to the public.  In denying the inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim, the United States Supreme
Court noted that the closure was limited to voir dire.66  There was
no evidence of jury misbehavior during jury selection and no evi-
dence that any juror lied during the process.  More importantly, the
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could not link de-
fense counsel’s failure to object to a reasonable probability of a dif-
ferent outcome in the trial.67  Hence, claims like the ones presented
in Cronic and Weaver would not provide a sustainable foundation
for ineffectiveness.
Finally, in the iconic68 case of Strickland v. Washington,69 the
United States Supreme Court was presented with a case wherein
the defendant brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
against his trial counsel after being convicted of three capital
murders, having been sentenced to death on each count.70  In con-
junction with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the de-
fendant asserted that his counsel violated his right to effective
counsel by not obtaining and presenting several documents which
would have provided mitigating evidence towards his sentencing.71
Trial counsel elected to only use the district court’s statements from
the plea colloquy to support the defendant’s claim for a more leni-
ent sentence.  During the plea colloquy, the defendant in Strickland
explained to the trial judge that he committed a string of felony
offenses, which included brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnap-
64. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
65. Id. at 1902.
66. Id. at 1903–04.
67. Id. at 1913–14.
68. Justin F. Marceau, Remedying Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, 45 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 277, 279 (2012), [hereinafter Pretrial Ineffectiveness] (reporting that
“the 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington made the Gideon v. Wainwright
promise of an attorney for all indigent defendants facing serious charges meaning-
ful by insisting that the mere appointment of counsel, standing alone, was inade-
quate to comply with the Sixth Amendment”). See also Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B. C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2009).
69. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
70. Id.
71. See State v. Gagliano, 438 N.W.2d 783, 787–88 (Neb. 1989).
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ping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and
theft.72  All felonies took place in Florida, and the defendant stated
to the court that he accepted responsibility for his actions.  The de-
fendant stated that the decision to commit these offenses stemmed
from his being under extreme stress and in need of a way to feed his
family.  The trial judge responded by stating that it “had a great
deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit
their responsibility.”73
At the sentencing hearing, counsel chose not to present any
corroborating evidence to support the defendant’s psychiatric sta-
bility, and he chose to not order a pre-sentencing report in anticipa-
tion of sentencing.  Counsel’s explanation for not presenting any
supporting evidence on this issue was his belief that reiterating the
district court’s statement during the hearing would be sufficient.
Counsel apparently believed that the defendant’s lack of any signif-
icant criminal history would also prevent him from receiving a
death sentence.  However, the State put on a wealth of evidence
regarding the details of how these gruesome felony offenses were
committed.  Without any mitigating evidence to weigh against the
aggravating circumstances, the district court found that all three
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, especially
because the victims were repeatedly stabbed.  The district court also
noted that at least one murder was committed during the commis-
sion of another dangerous and violent felony offense, and for pecu-
niary gain.74  Despite defense counsel’s hope that the mitigating
circumstances would shift the district court away from imposing the
death penalty, the district court concluded that the aggravating cir-
cumstances surrounding these heinous crimes far outweighed any
mitigating circumstances.75  Hence, the district court sentenced the
defendant to death on all three counts of murder and to various
prison terms for the other convictions.
This was a case of first impression for the United State Su-
preme Court, representing the first time the Court directly and fully
addressed a claim of “actual ineffectiveness.”76  While the Court
recognized that counsel of record in a felony criminal case is to con-
duct a substantial investigation77 into each of several plausible lines
of defense, the Court also conceded that counsel may still carry the
72. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672 (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 674.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 686.
77. See Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 1645, 1661–67 (2008) (discussing the benefits of counsel’s strategy of
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mantle of effectiveness if both the attorney’s experience and the
novelty of the defense strategy recommended by the defendant sug-
gested that a substantial investigation would be fruitless and unrea-
sonable.78  This case also created an analytical principle that many
criminal defense attorneys internally recite to themselves before
making their first appearance in court on behalf of a criminal client.
The motto that these advocates must become intimately familiar
with is as follows:  (1) whether my performance is within the range
demanded of lawyers in criminal cases, and (2) whether any profes-
sional errors I have committed could have changed the outcome of
the proceeding in an unfavorable way for my client.79
Any credible defense attorney would subscribe to the notion
that hindsight should never be the benchmark by which to judge the
effectiveness of an attorney’s performance.80  At the conclusion of a
trial is usually when critics surface.  Specifically, the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland articulated the following regarding the
hindsight evaluation process:
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney per-
formance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would en-
courage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.  Criminal
trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s un-
successful defense.  Counsel’s performance and even willingness
to serve could be adversely affected.  Intensive scrutiny of coun-
sel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could
dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense coun-
sel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine
the trust between attorney and client.81
One might ask whether there is hope for a convicted defendant
who believes that his attorney was incompetent, inexperienced, or
unconcerned.  There appear to be so many hurdles for a defendant
to overcome in order to prevail on the ineffective assistance claim.
intentionally failing to investigate as an advantage to the defendant in a capital
case).
78. See Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 104 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (underlining the factors needed to be
proven by a criminal defendant in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which
are:  (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant’s case because the errors were so serious that counsel
prohibited him from having a fair and impartial trial and counsel jeopardized the
reliability of the trial’s outcome). See also Robert R. Riggs, The T-Rex Without
Teeth:  Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007) [hereinafter T-Rex Without Teeth].
80. See Systemic Barriers, supra note 10, at 2104.
81. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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The defendant can become lethargic as a result the many loopholes
and exceptions if he makes the decision to challenge his conviction
due to his attorney’s performance.  Ideally, an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is a valid and credible argument for a defendant or
his post-conviction counsel provided that they methodically do their
homework before filing the petition.  Without adequate prepara-
tion,82 a defendant who challenges a felony conviction following his
direct appeal may fall prey to the same vices as the defendants dis-
cussed below.
II. THE DEFENDANT’S UPHILL BATTLE ON POST-CONVICTION
It is a well-settled principle in criminal justice jurisprudence
that over 90 percent83 of all criminal defendants charged with a fel-
ony offense enter a guilty plea to their charges and consequently
waive84 their right to a jury trial.  Notwithstanding the fact that
these defendants may have an assortment of explanations as to why
they decided to amend their plea, the resounding theme is that each
of them wants to avoid the embarrassment of being found guilty in
open court and they want to secure some form of leniency85 from
the judge during sentencing.  These unsuspecting defendants may
subsequently learn that a waiver of their right to bring an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim was inserted in the plea agreement
that circumvented their option of addressing this issue on direct ap-
peal or during a state or federal habeas corpus proceeding.  The
82. See T-Rex Without Teeth, supra note 79, at 83 (stating that there are in-
stances where defense counsel can make a purely professional decision not to en-
gage in an investigation if such activity is deemed to be unreasonable or
unnecessary). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90.
83. See Colin Miller, Anchors Away:  Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that
Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B. C. L. REV. 1667,
1724 (2013) (stating that more than 90 percent of all criminal cases are resolved by
plea bargains, and while most states do not allow the judges to participate in these
plea negotiations, some states have encouraged judges to be involved in these pro-
ceedings to ensure a fair and just agreement that will not be subject to a reversal
later) (citing Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations:  A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 24–49 (2009)).
84. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, advisory commit-
tee’s note to 1983 amendment (concluding that “were withdrawal [of a guilty plea]
automatic in every case where a defendant decided to alter his tactics and present
his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a
temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim”) (quot-
ing United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
85. See United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (arguing that
the “chief virtues” of a plea agreement are speed, economy, and finality).
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only salvation86 for these defendants is then to show a nexus be-
tween the waiver87 and counsel’s deficient88 performance.89  In es-
sence, the defendant’s burden of proof is similar to the burden of
proof for obtaining a new trial, which is as follows:  (1) whether
material evidence was discovered after the conviction, (2) whether
the evidence is both new and material, and (3) whether the evi-
dence is outcome-determinative.90
For example, in DeRoo v. United States,91 the defendant was
indicted for one count of possession of ammunition by a convicted
felon.92  He later entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 210
months of imprisonment with three years of supervised release and
a $50 special assessment fee.93  From the record, it appears that the
defendant waited until the day of trial to enter a guilty plea to the
offense under a plea agreement with the Government.94  In waiving
his right to a jury trial, the defendant also waived his right to con-
test both his judgment of conviction95 and sentence either on direct
appeal or on post-conviction appeal.  Despite the waiver, the defen-
86. See Pretrial Ineffectiveness, supra note 68, at 280 (summarizing that “the
dual requirement of proving deficient performance and prejudice has proven ‘no-
toriously difficult’ for all defendants”).
87. Waivers are not absolute, especially when a defendant waives his right to
appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in violation of the terms of an
agreement. See United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 872 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 525 U.S. 942 (1998).
88. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 979 (1993) (claiming that it is highly doubtful that a plea agree-
ment could waive a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant to plead guilty or accept
a particular plea bargain).
89. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (stating that “[a] decision to
enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing and voluntary when the plea agree-
ment itself is the result of advice outside ‘the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases’”).
90. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). See also United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d
457, 465 (5th Cir. 2004).
91. DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000).
92. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), 924(e)(1) (2012).
93. DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 919.
94. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66
FLA. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2015) [hereinafter Using Outcomes] (identifying prose-
cutors as wielding enormous power to not only control which cases are prosecuted,
but also dictating the charges imposed, drafting plea-bargaining agreements, and
rewarding leniency to defendants in order to induce guilty pleas). See also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor
who uses the possibility of imposing harsher offense that carries a mandatory life
sentence against a defendant who is reluctant to accepting a lenient plea offer was
not a violation of the defendant’s due process rights).
95. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(B).
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dant filed a motion to vacate96 his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.  The district court summarily denied the motion to vacate,
finding97 that a waiver which included a waiver of his right to ap-
peal both his conviction and sentence was enforceable.98
The Eight Circuit, however, declined to follow this jurispru-
dence and reserved judgment on the merits of the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim until the aggrieved defendant could show a
connection between the guilty plea with both (1) the waiver99 of
habeas corpus review and (2) his counsel’s advice, which allegedly
prejudiced100 his case.101  In other words, without a showing of
prejudice, it would be premature for the reviewing court to address
legal counsel’s alleged incompetence or deficient performance.102
A defendant does indeed face a “heavy burden” when he
makes the decision to challenge the legitimacy of his conviction
and/or sentence on the premise that his legal counsel was ineffec-
tive.103  However, not all allegations will constitute incompetence.
In United States v. Pruitt,104 the defendant, who was indicted for
conspiracy to possess methamphetamines along with two other drug
offenses, entered into a plea agreement with the Government
wherein he indicated that he would “not appeal whatever sentence
[was] imposed by the court.”105  The defendant later brought a mo-
tion to vacate his sentence under federal habeas corpus proceedings
on the claim that his counsel prejudiced his case by not drafting a
96. See Pretrial Ineffectiveness, supra note 68, at 281 (articulating that the gen-
eral antidote for a defendant subjected the ineffective assistance of counsel is to
reverse his recent conviction, and schedule a new trial because it puts all parties
back on equal footing in order to litigate the question of one’s guilt).
97. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (stating that a criminal
defendant may waive the statutory right to file a § 2255 petition challenging the
length of his sentence, but the waiver, by itself, cannot categorically foreclose the
bringing of such petition on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
98. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 924.
99. See Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assis-
tance—Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647, 657 (2013) (stating that it is
not rationally feasible that a defendant would waive a right that he cannot fully
appreciate until the waiver is signed; further, the defendant’s waiver would have to
be from a conflict-free attorney, not a self-interested one).
100. See Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2010) (ruling that the
statutory right to post-conviction counsel included the right to conflict-free coun-
sel, and because counsel “can hardly be expected to objectively evaluate his or her
performance;” thus, courts should either disqualify current counsel or obtain a
valid waiver of the conflict).
101. Id.
102. See United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
103. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
104. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1994).
105. See id. at 432.
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letter to the defendant’s probation officer, explaining that the de-
fendant had accepted responsibility for his actions.  Said letter was
intended to be a method by which the defendant would receive a
lesser sentence for the conviction in the case.  The Ninth Circuit
denied the motion to vacate, finding that the defendant could not
prove that he was prejudiced because the defendant drafted a letter
explaining all of the same information that he initially wanted his
attorney to disclose in his letter.106  The Ninth Circuit also found
that the district court was unmoved by the information included in
the defendant’s pro se letter, and that counsel’s failure to draft the
letter to the court did not negatively impact the sentence.107  In ad-
dition, the Ninth Circuit opined that the defendant was originally
facing a sentence of at least ten years, but with the plea agree-
ment—which was negotiated by defense counsel—the defendant
was only going to serve 48 months.108
We can conclude from the various holdings listed above that a
defendant’s desire to erase his conviction and/or sentence through a
habeas corpus proceeding will be fruitless if the defendant cannot
first prove that he suffered some form of prejudice and that the
prejudice was as a result of legal counsel’s below-average perform-
ance.  The defendant’s evidence of prejudicial behavior, without a
doubt, cannot simply be counsel’s rejection of an irrelevant trial
strategy109 or his failure to lodge a useless objection.110  However, if
the defendant’s proof of ineffectiveness is his attorney’s failure to
file a notice of appeal despite the presence of an appeal waiver111
that was knowingly inserted in the plea agreement, then defense
counsel may not be able to escape unscathed.112
106. Id.
107. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.
108. Id.
109. See State v. Hoppens, 140 S.3d 293, 302–03 (stating that counsel’s failure
to object to invalid errors is not a sign of counsel’s ineffectiveness).
110. See State v. Allen, 03-2418 (La. 6/29/05); 913 So.2d 788, cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1132 (2006) (declaring that counsel’s failure to object to the sufficiency of the
factual basis in a change of plea hearing or to omit making an Alford plea would
be indications of counsel’s ineffectiveness).
111. See Systemic Barriers, supra note 10, at 2105 (finding that the uninten-
tional consequence of appeal waivers is that it leaves the unsuspecting criminal
defendant to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and without any valid recourse).
112. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005) (claiming
that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be established
by his attorney’s failure to file a notice of appeal even though an appeal waiver was
included in the agreement and the defendant instructed his attorney to file the
document anyway).  However, the appellate courts in Nunez v. United States, 546
F.3d 450, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d
Cir. 2008), declined to follow the holding in Garrett, questioning when defense
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In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,113 the defendant was convicted follow-
ing his entry of a guilty plea114 to second-degree murder.  Defen-
dant requested that his attorney file a notice of appeal regarding his
conviction.  Defense counsel assured the defendant that she would
prepare the appellate documents, but failed to do so.  Because
counsel failed to preserve her client the constitutional right to ap-
peal his conviction, whether purposefully or negligently,115 the
United States Supreme Court declared counsel’s conduct to be
“professionally116 unreasonable.”117
Accordingly, any defendant who attempts to prevail in a
habeas corpus proceeding by sacrificing his counsel on the altar of
the federal Constitution must be able to portray to the court that he
was prejudiced (i.e., wrongfully convicted and sentenced) and that
the prejudicial action resulted from the skill set of a less than aver-
age advocate.  The defendant must also indicate that his attorney’s
uninformed decisions resulted in him impulsively surrendering his
right to contest the Government’s evidence in a jury trial.118.  Ma-
nipulation of this caliber is a violation of Gideon119 and is the best
evidence of ineffectiveness.
counsel could be declared ineffective for respecting the terms of the plea
agreement.
113. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 470 (2000).
114. Using Outcomes, supra note 94, at 826 (supporting the notion that the
current criminal justice system is a system of pleas, not a system of trials; further,
the United States Supreme Court has now framed the task of the federal judicial
system as reorienting the constitutional criminal law to fit this reality).
115. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (asserting that
the decision as to whether the right to a jury trial or the right to waive the assis-
tance of counsel remains with the defendant regardless of counsel’s personal
opinion).
116. Laurence A. Steckman, Attorney Inaction as Trial Strategy:  A Study of
the Effects of Judicial Use of Non-Action Neutral Language on the Analysis and
Adjudication of Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment, 6 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 89 (1989) (declaring that counsel’s trial strategy of
standing mute during trial was neither professional nor an effective strategy).
117. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (holding that guilty plea cannot truly be vol-
untary unless defendant possesses knowledge of how law relates to facts).
118. Using Outcomes, supra note 94, at 827 (boosting the idea that the plea-
bargaining process is terribly complicated and can lead to defendants being at the
mercy of overburdened, underfunded appointed counsel, and these defendants
may lack access to important information about their plea options or find it diffi-
cult to weigh whether to accept a plea deal or risk trial). See also STEPHANOS
BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30–33 (2012); Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protec-
tion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1153–59 (2011).
119. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Sys-
temic Barriers, supra note 10, at 2106.
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III. DO YOU REALLY WANT TO HAVE A CRIMINAL LAW
PRACTICE?
Law students who have voiced an interest in practicing crimi-
nal law have always articulated to the Author a desire to represent
the poor and disadvantaged.  They were sickened by the way the
indigent120 were treated in criminal court, and they wanted to end
the cycle of neglect by providing not only a competent ear, but also
a caring and concerned voice to those individuals who have suffered
under the iron hand of the law.  Growing up in the inner city of
New Orleans, this Author can appreciate the sentiments of those
who carry a passion for the poor, the abused, and the neglected.
This Author was also a former assistant district attorney and an ad-
vocate for battered women in domestic violence cases.  For the past
fifteen years, this Author has also represented criminal defendants
on direct appeal in both state and federal courts, and from this ex-
perience, there remains one central theme that he would stress to
anyone brave enough to open the doors of their practice to this
particular field of law—record everything!  The Apostle Paul wrote:
“Brethren, my heart;s desire and prayer to God for Israel is that
they might be saved.  For I bear them record that they have a zeal
. . . but not according to knowledge.”121
In like manner, this Author sincerely believes that those who
enter the corridors of the state and federal criminal courts sincerely
want to honor their quest to reform the justice system, but also be-
lieves that they will not clear this hurdle unless they fully under-
stand the dynamics of this venture.  Israel, as mentioned in this
particular scripture, is synonymous for those attorneys who elect to
represent criminal defendants.  These attorneys must be equipped
with the knowledge and the patience to perform their task well.
Without this knowledge, they are destined to not only fail, but to
fail in the worst possible way.
Consider, for example, the situation where a young man
named John122 happens to be walking along the beach when he sees
someone struggling in the water.  John knows how to swim and has
been trained as a life guard when he was a teenager.  John enters
the water with the intent of saving this person who is only seconds
away from drowning.  Though John knows how to swim, he also
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (1948).
121. See Romans 10:1–2 (King James).
122. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know,
60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981) (stating that an “analogy is the application of a trained,
disciplined intuition where the manifold of particulars is too extensive to allow our
minds to work on it deductively”).
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knows that if he neglects his training, he could drown because the
person who he is helping is so desperate to survive that he will not
hesitate to push John down in the water just so he can make it back
to shore.
Being a criminal attorney in many ways is like being a life-
guard:  we are entrusted with the responsibility to preserve life.  Al-
though we accept criminal cases with the mindset of providing
competent legal representation to those in dire circumstances, it can
become a pivotal moment in our career if we forget, even for a
second, that our clients would not delay in placing the blame of
their conviction in our laps when it is convenient for them to do so.
On many occasions, this Author has had to endure bar complaints
from former clients because the trial strategy that was implemented
was not successful123 in getting them acquitted.  Because my post-
conviction clients have been more demanding and less forgiving
than all of my other clients combined, the United States Supreme
Court has opined that attorneys, like this Author, should be given
the presumption124 that the trial strategy, though not favorable to
the defendant, may actually still be sound, reasonable, and credi-
ble.125  Some scholars would disagree, arguing that the indigent de-
fendant’s perspective is most relevant.126  Thankfully, the United
States Supreme Court, through Strickland, has served to “limit the
pool of litigants [rather] than . . . expand it.”127
Because my criminal clients have spent countless hours in the
prison law libraries, they have not been shy about educating me on
what the law is and on how to draft the various petitions, motions,
and briefs that are necessary to provide reasonable representation.
Over the years, I have seen the fundamental transformation of
criminal attorneys from the role of advocate to that of butler.  The
“butler” reference is not meant to insinuate that attorneys should
ignore their client’s wishes or instructions.  Rather, this Author’s
use of the term “butler” is reserved for those situations where the
123. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (citing that a fair
assessment of the counsel’s performance on behalf of the defendant is not dis-
torting effects of hindsight or to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s chal-
lenged conduct, but to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time
of the representation). See also You Can’t Get There from Here, supra note 24, at
569.
124. Id. at 669 (“A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective
Assistance Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After the AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
545, 570 (2009) (citing Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
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defendant instructs (sometimes commands) the attorney to make
an argument, file a motion, or address an issue with outdated juris-
prudence, and then expects the attorney to simply comply with
those instructions without protest.128  Clearly, if my client desires to
file a direct appeal or a writ application to the high court, I would
not try to suppress their constitutional right to do so, but this same
client should also expect me to advise him on the likelihood of suc-
cess with his specific argument.  Consequently, the attorney is ethi-
cally129 bound to not deprive the defendant of the knowledge of the
potential downfalls of presenting certain arguments to the court in
light of the existing statute(s) and/or jurisprudence.130  In this man-
ner, we are acting more as a partner in the defendant’s representa-
tion as opposed to maintaining a master-servant relationship.
Post-conviction clients generally threaten to terminate legal
representation if the attorney ever refuses or fails to do exactly
what they are told to do.  Bar complaints are commonly used by
defendants as leverage at any given stage of the proceeding, and
appellate131 and trial attorneys are never far away from the prover-
bial “chopping block” whenever the defendant becomes unhappy
with  counsel’s execution of duties.  For this reason, this Author
kindly warns both trial and appellate counsel against being care-
less132 and urges them to document every conversation, trial strat-
egy, oral objection, assignment of error, and legal argument made
in any given criminal matter.  Through this documentation, the at-
torney preserves an explanation for himself in the event that he or
she is ever called to testify in a post-conviction matter on ineffective
128. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960–61 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (finding the majority’s decision not to grant certiorari was clear error be-
cause defense counsel gave absolute deference to the uniformed reaction of a
defendant whose mental capabilities were questionable, and the majority made it
appear to be reasonable for counsel not to pursue an independent investigation
into his client’s history of mental illness, but to defer his client’s wishes without
regard to his client’s knowledge of or his ability to understand the law). See also T-
Rex Without Teeth, supra note 79, at 84–85.
129. See generally David Hricik and Jae Ellis, Disparities in Legal Ethical
Standards Between State and Federal Judicial Systems:  An Analysis and a Critique,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 577 (2000).
130. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (stating the defen-
dant’s sole responsibility in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is to demon-
strate to the court that he would have timely appealed his case to the higher court
if it had not been for his lawyer’s deficient performance).
131. See Jacob Szewczyk, Following Orders:  Campbell v. United States, the
Waiver of Appellate Rights, and the Duty of Counsel, 64 CATH. U. LA. REV. 489
(2015) (claiming that defense counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal, even if the
defendant has waived his right to appeal in a plea bargain, actually robs a defen-
dant of this crucial proceeding).
132. See Pretrial Ineffectiveness, supra note 68, at 285.
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assistance of counsel.  Nevertheless, the attorney must meditate on
his ethical obligations while sharing information with his client and
disclosing information to the prosecution during discovery.133
On several occasions, this Author, as appellate counsel, has
had to explain in a very diplomatic manner why trial counsel failed
to either raise a particular objection or make a clear record of an
argument when the case was on appeal.  Without a contemporane-
ous objection or an adequate discussion on the record of a specific
claim or argument, the appellate courts are inclined134 either to dis-
miss the appeal, to find no merit whatsoever to the claim, or to
overshadow the district court’s unjustified ruling by cloaking it with
harmless135 error, in essence telling the legal community there is
nothing to see here!
The attorney-client relationship is a fleeting concept because
everything hinges on whether the counselor’s trial strategy136 was
profitable for the defendant.  Thus, it is incumbent on the attorney
to document the substance and length of his conversations with the
client.137  The attorney should record the statistical likelihood that
his client’s argument of choice would be viewed favorable by a
twelve-member jury.  The attorney should share this research with
the client as often138as possible.  Counsel should file any and all
pleadings and motions timely and adequately prepare to question
the State’s witnesses.  Maintaining open and continuous dialogue
with the client and his loved ones can be a valuable antidote for an
improper ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v.
Middleton,139 an attorney was found in violation of the Maryland
133. Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment:  The Need for
a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE L. J. 572, 644–645 (1991) (indicating that defense
counsel is “not generally required to make the prosecution’s case for them, so long
as the defense’s (sic) investigation does not conceal or otherwise impede the prose-
cution’s discovery of the evidence”).
134. See Switzer v. United States, 131 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1942). See also
Ametovski v. I.N.S., 935 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute:  Is It Be-
yond Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 283, (2004) (arguing that the problem with 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) is that the statute is ambiguous as to what type of and how much
deference is owed to state court convictions and under what conditions).
136. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to
Call a Witness:  Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 763 (2000) (arguing that all tactical and strategic decisions should be reserved
for the attorney, who, while acting as a detached expert, would not have time to
engage in meaningful consultation with the defendant on every decision).
137. See generally id.
138. See generally id.
139. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Middleton, 756 A.2d 565 (Md. 2000).
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Disciplinary Code when the court cited the following errors com-
mitted by this attorney during a criminal case: First, counsel failed
to meet with or review possible defense strategies with his client.
Secondly, counsel failed to “[p]ursue a motion to suppress evidence
that may have been illegally obtained.”140  Third, the attorney failed
to present an available intoxication defense as mitigation.  Fourth,
counsel failed to adequately prepare to cross-examine the State’s
witnesses.  Lastly, the attorney failed to request specific jury in-
structions relative to the charges at issue and to object to poten-
tially improper jury instructions that may have been prejudicial to
his client.141
Reciprocally, the attorney should not be so dismissive of the
client’s thoughts, strategies and ideas.  After all, the defendant’s
freedom is in jeopardy. The defendants will be the ones to suffer
the consequences of being found guilty and they are the ones who
will be removed from their family for an extended period of time.
The clients’ relationships with their children will also be broken by
their incarceration.
Appellate counsel should have regular contact with prior coun-
sel and thoroughly question prior counsel not only on trial strate-
gies, but also on tactics that previous counsel outright rejected.
Appellate counsel should also get an explanation of the overall de-
meanor and personality of the defendant142 during these proceed-
ings.  When the relationship can no longer be salvaged, the attorney
should be willing to disclose all available options to the defendant,
encourage the defendant to consult with independent counsel, and
then surrender all information143 and unearned funds144 to the cli-
ent when the client has shown that he understands the risks and has
elected to take those risks.145  Typically, a defendant pleads guilty
to avoid a harsher sentence.  The prosecutor will benefit from the
quick conviction, and the district court conserves scarce judicial re-
sources.146  However, defendants are never opposed to undoing this
plea agreement if they find that their attorney has misled them
140. Id. at 568.
141. Id. at 568.
142. Id. at 568–75; T-Rex Without Teeth, supra note 79, at 103-04.
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
145. See Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 153–54 (Mo. 2011) (declaring that a
defendant can waive his right to seek post-conviction relief in return for a reduced
sentence if the record clearly demonstrates the defendant was adequately in-
formed of his rights and that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently).
146. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that the purpose of
the harmless error rule is to conserve scarce judicial resources and to avoid point-
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solely to reach a quick conclusion to the case.147  For this reason,
attorneys who fail to recognize this truth and the impact that comes
with establishing a criminal defense practice will undeniably suffer
the penalty of being naive and unprepared.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the public protest, criminal defense is a noble profes-
sion.  We are required to provide reasonable, competent, and pro-
fessional representation to individuals charged with felony and
misdemeanor crimes.  Defending people charged as murderers, rap-
ists, and child molesters is always difficult and challenging, espe-
cially when the facts of the case are horrific and terribly graphic.
Nevertheless, the charge of every attorney is to guarantee that their
clients will receive a fair148 and impartial trial, and that every rule of
evidence and every statute in criminal procedure will be adhered to
without exception.
However, these attorneys must keep in mind that the desire of
freedom is so strong that the individuals they are entrusted to re-
present can make the attorney a defendant in post-conviction pro-
ceedings.  Therefore, we must be vigilant149 and forward-thinking150
with regard to our representation.  Record everything.  Share eve-
rything you have learned in your representation with your clients
and with their family members if the client gives prior authoriza-
tion.151  Share your thoughts, notes, and research.  Counsel should
engage in meaningful conversation with every person remotely as-
sociated with his client’s case.152  Remember, the habeas corpus
less trials, and to prevent an abuse of the judicial process that would bestir the
public to ridicule it). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673 (1986).
147. See Using Outcomes, supra note 94, at 833 (quoting Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)).
148. See T-Rex Without Teeth, supra note 79, at 83 (asserting that the re-
sounding purpose of the Sixth Amendment as articulated in Strickland, is to ensure
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial).
149. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 (1984) (finding defense
counsel’s trial strategy to be totally unreasonable in light of the ABA Standards).
150. See generally Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
151. See MODEL RULES OF PRO’F CONDUCT R. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(stating that the lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any decision or circum-
stance relative to the case, and to reasonably consult with the client on the means
to accomplish client’s objectives).
152. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 368–96 (2000) (holding
that counsel was ineffective in his representation of a defendant in a capital mur-
der case where counsel failed to properly investigate his client’s childhood which
could have mitigated his sentence; counsel did not present the “extensive records
that graphically described the defendant’s nightmarish childhood or the fact that
he was repeatedly abused by his biological parents, foster parents, and was border-
line mentally retarded”).
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process is the defendant’s second bite153 at the apple, and these in-
dividuals will not waver in taking that infamous bite out of their
attorney.
153. Id.
